-- -- sefer 2. Śiḥot musar ṿe-hitbonenut she-neʼemru bi-Yeshivat Ponivez' -- sefer 3. Elul, Yamim noraʼim.

1. Ḥidushe sugyot -- 2. Sheʼelot u-teshuvot -- 3. Sugyot derushim.

Oholekha Yaʻaḳov -- Et amalenu -- Melekhet H.

1. Elul. Rosh ha-Shanah -- 2. ʻAśeret yeme teshuvah, Yom Kipur, Sukot, Simḥat Torah -- 3. Ḥanukah. Tu bi-Shevat. Purim. 4 Parashiyot. Sefirat ha-ʻOmer. Shevuʻot -- 4. Pesaḥ.

An academic anthology on Jewish studies and education in memory of dr. Avraham Zalkin.

[1] Lev Yehudah ḥeleḳ 1, u-vo ḥidushim u-veʼurim be-ʻinyanim shonim. Lev Yehudah ḥeleḳ 2, u-vo heʻarot ṿe-heʼarot ḳetsarot. Boʼu ḥeshbon, u-vo heʻarot be-ḥeshbonot u-midot Ḥazal -- [2] Ḳunṭres Boʼu ḥeshbon ḥeleḳ 2.

The dispute between nomological realists and anti-realists has been reflected in the formulation of various arguments and counterarguments that reach topics as diverse as modality, induction and the very scientific practice. In this context it is common to take the main realist argument –the nomological argument– for an instance of Inference to the Best Explanation, while Nomological Anti-realism is considered a skeptical alternative concerning natural laws, sustained by independent reasons. This paper aims to review that image of the Nomological Realism (...) vs. Anti-realism debate in light of what we believe is an appropriate distinction between abduction and Inference to the Best Explanation. (shrink)

Para el realismo nomológico, la mejor explicación del mundo afirma la existencia de leyes naturales que lo fundamentan. Si el estatuto de estas es controvertido, sus partidarios coinciden en que implican una adición de ser con respecto a las regularidades de Hume. Se busca mostrar cómo el argumento nomológico, que todos ellos utilizan de alguna forma, se asemeja en su estructura a diversos argumentos teístas, como el de la quinta vía de Tomás de Aquino. Ante el carácter no conclusivo del (...) argumento, se sostiene que la adopción de un realismo nomológico proviene de una mera preferencia subjetiva. According to nomological realism, the best explanation of the world is one that appeals to the existence of natural laws which ground it. Althought there are controversies regarding the status of such laws, those who defend this position agree they involve a plus of being regarding Hume's regularities. In this paper we show how the nomological argument, which they all use somehow, has a structural similarity with various theistic arguments such as Thomas Aquina's fifth way. Finally, in the absence of conclusiveness of the argument, we hold that the adoption of a nomological realism comes from a mere subjective preference. (shrink)